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Abstract
This paper discusses mixing of chaotic systems
as a dependable method for secure communication.
Distribution of the entropy function for steady state
as well as plaintext input sequences are analyzed.
It is shown that the mixing of chaotic sequences
results in a sequence that does not have any state
dependence on the information encrypted by them.
The generated output states of such a cipher ap-
proach the theoretical maximum for both complex-
ity measures and cycle length. These features are
then compared with some popular ciphers.
Keywords: chaos, stream ciphers, logistic
equation, mixing of chaos
1 Introduction
With the advent of the world wide web and e-
commerce, research in digital cryptography [1] has
acquired a renewed momentum. In general, the al-
gorithms used for cryptographic applications may
be classified into two, namely, public key cryptog-
raphy and secret key cryptography. Public key
cryptography uses separate keys to encrypt and
decrypt an information. In this system a person
uses his private key and the public key of the le-
gitimate recipient to encrypt a message. At the
receiving side, the message is decoded using the
public key of the sender and the private key of the
recipient. The advantage of the scheme is that any-
one can send an information securely to the person
who has a public key and make sure that only the
addressee will be able to read it. Thus they are
mainly used for secure exchange of information be-
tween two persons who need not trust each other.
Public key cryptosystems accomplish this by rely-
ing on the inability of present day tools to factor
large numbers (eg. RSA like implementations) or
on the difficulty in solving the discrete logarithm
problem (Diffie-Hellman like implementations) etc.
[2]. Since such computations take reasonable time
on most implementations, they become vulnerable
to a host of attacks. The nature of the key may
be understood by monitoring the time taken for
encryption and decryption. This is the basis of
timing attack. A slightly different attack known as
the differential power analysis monitors the power
consumed by the encoding devices and deduce in-
formation on the secret key. A more generalized at-
tack known as differential cryptanalysis maps the
correspondence between the plain text and cipher
text symbols (state vectors) to decode the secret
key. On the other hand, secret key cryptography,
popularly known as stream ciphers use the same
key for encryption and decryption. Since this de-
mands the secure exchange of secret keys between
the users, their role is slightly different from that
of public key cryptosystems. They are mainly used
for the secure storage and retrieval of information.
For example, in the banking sector or in the credit
card application, there is no need for a public key.
Since the user need not have to declare any public
key, these ciphers are generally more secure com-
pared to public key cryptosystems. Most of the
stream ciphers use simple logical operations that
are very fast compared to public key cryptosystems
and are thus immune to differential power analysis
or timing attacks. However, they could be vulnera-
ble to differential cryptanalysis, brute force attacks
and known plaintext attacks unless necessary pre-
cautions are taken.
Most stream ciphers rely on random number
generators for encryption. At the transmitter side
the secret information is added to a random car-
rier signal. At the receiving end it is subtracted
out from the received signal to retrieve the infor-
mation. Since a random process cannot be repro-
duced with certainty, it is not possible to generate
the same random sequence at both the transmitter
and receiver simultaneously. The general practice
is to use pseudo-random numbers that can be gen-
erated at both sides without difficulty.
Studies in nonlinear dynamics shows that many
of the seemingly complex systems in nature are
described by very simple mathematical equations
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[3, 4, 5]. Fractal images, for example, are capa-
ble of traversing the embedding space in minimum
time, a feature that is referred to as the space filling
ability of fractal images. Viewed from the crypto-
graphic point of view, this is equivalent to the max-
imum cycle length [6], a feature expected from a
good random number generator (RNG). Although
chaotic systems appear to be highly irregular, they
are also deterministic in the sense that it is possible
to reproduce them with certainty. These promis-
ing features of chaotic systems attracted many re-
searchers to try chaos as a possible medium for
secure communication. Chaos was successfully im-
plemented in analog secure systems following the
works of Pecora and Carroll in 1990 [7, 8, 9]. How-
ever, implementations in digital systems have not
yet been successful. The major reason why digi-
tal cryptography using chaos did not turn out to
be effective is that digital circuits deal with finite
number spaces. Chaos is a phenomenon in which
even very small variations in the initial state of
a system results in exponentially diverging evolu-
tion of its future states. When dealing with finite
number space, chaos looses this diversity due to
the restricted resolution of possible states. How-
ever, many researchers have pointed out that mix-
ing of pseudo random sequences of finite preci-
sion are able to produce rather complex sequences
[10, 11, 12, 13]. Their studies were however largely
limited to linear systems. The present paper is an
extension of these encouraging observations to non-
linear chaotic systems that have many additional
features suitable for cryptography.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In
section 2 we introduce the new cipher that gener-
ates a space filling sequence by mixing two chaotic
sequences. Section 3 discusses the software imple-
mentation of the cipher. Section 4 presents some
popular cryptanalysis techniques on the proposed
system. Some methods to investigate the security
aspects of a cipher in general are also discussed.
Finally, Section 5 compares the new cipher with
three popular ciphers.
2 Mixing of chaotic sequences
One major difference between digital and analog
systems is the introduction of round-off errors in
digital systems. This is observed to give some pe-
culiar effects that are explained in detail in [14]. On
the other hand, the assurance of exact reproducibil-
ity is an added advantage of digital systems. Stud-
ies on digital chaos generators have been reported
to have more diversity compared to their analog
counterparts [15]. This is encouraging, since cryp-
tographic applications are mostly on digital plat-
forms.
Matthews [16] in 1989 proposed an encryption
algorithm using the principles of chaos. He gener-
alized the logistic equation (see equation 1) with
cryptographic considerations and used the last two
decimal digits of the generated sequence to get the
random sequence. This system was found to have
various drawbacks as pointed out by Wheeler [17].
Matthews’ algorithm gave way to one-way func-
tions [18] in 1990.
A common route to chaos in most systems is
through period doubling [3]. In the fully devel-
oped chaotic system, there exist simultaneously a
large number of unstable periodic trajectories for
the evolution of the system. At this stage even
minor fluctuations in their initial conditions would
cause the system to switch between different trajec-
tories. Although the digital systems are restricted
by the finite discrete space, it may be shown that a
proper shuffling of these states can generate pseudo
random sequences with many interesting proper-
ties. This is in agreement with the observations
made by other researchers as it would be described
below.
For the discussion of the proposed method of
shuffling or mixing of chaotic states of a system,
we take the logistic equation as an example. The
logistic equation is an iterative equation in which
every upcoming state xn+1 is defined as a nonlinear
function of the present state xn as:
xn+1 = 4λxn(1− xn) with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (1)
If a graph is plotted with different values for the
control parameter, λ, many interesting properties
of non-linear systems may be observed. When the
value of λ is close to zero, the sequence converges
to some steady value after a few iterations. On
increasing the value of λ it enters a periodic cycle.
Increasing the value of λ further results in a feature
known as period doubling and finally, at values of λ
close to one, the sequence appears to be completely
random. At this stage, even slight variations in the
value of xn at any instant would result in very large
(exponential) variations in the subsequent evolu-
tion of the system. This is referred to as chaos [3].
It should be noted that in the logistic equation, the
xn+1th state is completely defined by xn. This is
what is known as dependence on initial conditions.
Although the sequence of values generated by the
system at this stage appears to be random, they
are in fact highly deterministic as can be seen from
their attractor structure shown in figure 1. This
makes the system insecure for cryptographic appli-
cations.
To study the effect of mixing, let us consider
two separate logistic equations. Let xn and x
′
n be
two points on the nearby trajectories of such two
systems. For simplicity we assume that the control
parameter λ is the same for both the systems. We
now define the evolution of a new system by the
following sequence of equations:
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Figure 1: The attractor of the logistic equation is
an inverted parabola. The peak of the parabola
corresponds to the value of the control parameter
λ
xn+1 = 4λxn(1− xn)
x′n+1 = 4λx
′
n(1− x
′
n)
Pn = xn ⊕ x
′
n
xn = xn+1 ⊕ Cn
x′n = x
′
n+1
(2)
The ⊕ operator represent the XOR operation.
We refer to equation (2) as the cipher equation in
the rest of the paper.
As mentioned earlier, combining adjacent states
of a system using XOR function is not new in
cryptography. Ritter for example present the con-
cept of pseudo-random shuffling [10] as a very ef-
ficient method for random sequence generation.
MacLaren et al. [11] showed that combining two
congruential generators would give a more com-
plex random sequence than individual congruen-
tial generators. In cellular automata, Wolfram [12]
suggested a linear array of elements a[0]...a[n] and
an iterative equation a[i] = (a[i-1]) XOR (a[i] OR
a[i+1]) to construct a RNG. The output was taken
as a portion of the state vector. An analysis of such
systems was made by Rietman [19]. Many com-
biners using linear feedback shift registers (LFSR)
have also been attempted as alternate sources of
random number generators [13]. However, these
were on linear systems and due to their inher-
ent linearity, they become vulnerable to a known
plain text attack or correlation attack [20]. In the
proposed system, the mixing is done on nonlinear
systems at the onset of chaos. Thus the mixing
is equivalent to a continuous perturbation on a
chaotic system causing the system to jump from
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Figure 2: A fully developed chaotic system has
many unstable states of excitation. The mixing
of two nearby trajectories of the logistic equation
destroy the attractor structure and the correlation
of adjacent states. This is identical to a continuous
perturbation on an unstable system.
one unstable trajectory to another in accordance
with the perturbation. The system is still deter-
ministic as long as the nonlinear equations are de-
fined. However, the sequence of iterative equations
produces a high order Markov process due to the
shuffling process in the finite space [21] making the
generated sequence appear as random to the in-
truder. This is illustrated in figure 2 where in-
stead of the attractor, we have a space filling noise
like pattern in the phase space. The points in the
plot will be identical in two instances if and only
if the encrypted text and the initial conditions of
the logistic equations are all the same. It is pos-
sible to prevent the occurrence of such a situation
by initializing the logistic equation by some non-
repetitive parameter, e.g. a psedo random number
generated using the time of the day as the seed.
Although such a parameter appears to be insecure,
this is not a serious issue since the actual security
of the system is not based on the value of this pa-
rameter. Even a slight deviation in the value of
this parameter causes the evolution of the system
to diverge away exponentially from each other, an
inherent property of chaotic systems, making an
entirely new sequence even when the plaintext con-
tents are the same.
Also note that in the iterative formula suggested
in the cipher equation, Cn is the pseudo random ci-
pher text and is defined outside equation 2. For the
purpose of this paper, we will define Cn = Pn ⊕ yn
with yn as the plaintext data stream. We will de-
scribe a multiple encryption scheme later in the
paper which can improve the security of the sys-
tem further by an exponential factor.
3 Implementation
In the software implementation, the starting
value x1 was selected as a pseudo random variable
and x
′
1 was computed from x1. Since the value
of x1 is required to reconstruct the sequence, it
was transmitted along with the cipher text. A
dummy sequence of random numbers, the length of
which is agreed by the legitimate users, were used
to hide the location of x1. It is possible to adopt
any steganographic methods to hide the starting
value, for example, as the nth bit of a set of bits
in a dummy sequence. The data stream was then
grouped into blocks of cipher texts with a set of
synchronizing pulses to ensure proper alignment.
All these signals are encrypted that they appear ex-
actly like the encrypted information signal to the
intruder. Grouping into blocks and synchroniza-
tion pulses are not required by the algorithm, but
are included to show that such locations may be
used to place tracking codes, error correction codes
or CRC codes.
4 Cryptanalysis
From cryptographic considerations, three mea-
sures on the ciphertext contribute significantly to-
wards the security of the information ciphered by
them. They are the Combiner Correlation [22],
the Cycle-Length [6] and the Complexity Measure
[23]. Combiner Correlation estimate the probabil-
ity with which the output of the cipher becomes
identical to that of the input [22]. In our example,
it is the correlation between yn and Cn . If for ex-
ample the output follows the input by an unequal
number of times, this information may be used to
break the cipher. The simplest way to compute
this correlation is by writing a table of the possible
inputs and the corresponding outputs. For simplic-
ity, it is assumed that the variables are of single bit
boolean type. In table 1, for single variables like
xn, their actual value is indicated, while for com-
parison of two variables, we put a 1 to indicate that
the variables are equal. For example yn = Cn has
a value 1 to indicate that they are equal. As it can
be seen (last column), the cipher text has equal
probability of occurrence when the values of xn, x
′
n
and yn flips their states. Since the cipher equation
uses the XOR operation, which is a bit level mod 2
addition operation, the same pattern repeats even
when the variables are multiple bit words. Thus
the proposed system will not leak out any informa-
tion regarding the possible input state vectors in
the cipher text.
xn x
′
n Pn yn Cn yn = Cn
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 1
50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Table 1: The table shows the possible distribution
of the cipher text and the intermediate states for
the possible values of xn and x
′
n.
4.1 Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis [24] makes use of some
chosen plain texts to explore any possible corre-
lation between the plain text and the cipher text
state vectors. It is difficult to prove that a cipher
would be equally strong in hiding vital information
about itself irrespective of the plain text patterns
enciphered by it. However, there are a few stan-
dard tests to verify such possibilities. One test is
to look for the existence of indicative variations in
the probability distribution density of the output
states of the cipher text as a function of the plain
text information masked by it. A reliable mea-
sure of this is the cycle length [6] of the ciphertext
when the plain text consists of only one kind of
symbol. Popular measures on cycle length such as
the run-up tests are difficult on self-synchronous
ciphers of the type discussed here. We thus do an
indirect measurement of this feature. Information
theoretical computations such as entropy measures
are based on the probability distribution of state
vectors in a sequence. A uniform distribution of
state vectors at all possible values in a finite space
is equivalent to a maximum cycle length since such
a distribution demands the system to traverse all
possible states before repetition. This can be di-
rectly measured as the probability of occurrence of
each state vector in the finite space when the length
of the sequence is in the order of the total number
of possible states.
Two different sets of ASCII character sequences
were used for the analysis. In the first round of
tests, the sequences consisted of each with a single
ASCII character repeated 9464 times. We say that
the information is masked by the cipher, if it is not
possible to identify any specific trend in the cipher
corresponding to the distribution in the plain text.
For ease of comparison, we computed the entropy
distribution of the sequences. If the probability
distribution density of the plain text character x
in the cipher text is distributed over a range of
M possible states and if the population density in
each state is Pj , then the Shannon entropy of the
distribution in unit bits is given by
Hx = −
j=M∑
j=1
Pj ∗ log2Pj
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Figure 3: The entropy distribution of the proposed
system as a function of bit count. The entire 16 bit
number space was divided into 30,000 equal slots.
The distribution is for eight bit ASCII characters
represented by decimal digits 01, 30, 31 and 255.
Note the linear increase in the entropy distribution
as a function of the bit count. This indicates a
uniform distribution at all bit levels and hence a
maximum cycle length for the random sequence.
The graphical representation of this measure re-
veals any orientation of the distribution density
towards the corresponding plain text information.
The distribution of the entropy of the cipher texts
corresponding to the ASCII characters represented
by the decimal digits 01, 30, 31 and 256 are shown
in figure 3. An enlarged portion of figure 3 is
shown in figure 4. Figure 3 indicates that the en-
tropy converges to the same value while its deviates
slightly in the middle. Also it is observed that the
entropy distribution increases linearly as a function
of the bit-count. This means there is a uniform
distribution of the random values over the entire
state vector space. In other words, the cipher has
effectively masked the information by generating a
space filling sequence with uniform probability of
occurrence at all levels, which is ideal from a theo-
retical point of view.
In the second round of tests, we used random
sequences of English prose of equal length as plain
text. It was observed that the entropy curves were
more linear and indistinguishable compared to that
of the single variable sequences.
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5
5.2
5.4
5.6
5.8
15000 16000 17000 18000 19000 20000
Figure 4: A magnified view of the central region
of figure 3 shows a marginal deviation in the en-
tropy distribution for each ASCII value. Although
it appears to reveal some information regarding the
plain text information, it remains to be known how
far this could be used as a possible tool for breaking
the cipher equation.
In both cases, the linearity of the curve ensures
maximum cycle length and uniform distribution
over all the possible state vectors [23], while the
non-linearity of the chaotic system introduces nec-
essary randomness. Thus we expect the cipher to
be reasonably secure against differential cryptanal-
ysis.
4.2 Complexity measure
The widely accepted test for the randomness of
a sequence is the Chi-square test [21]. The cipher
described in the present paper uses the cipher text
itself as part of its input vectors. As a consequence,
just like other self-synchronous stream ciphers, it is
difficult to judge this cipher using Chi-square tests.
However, the randomness of a sequence may be
estimated from its complexity. By complexity we
mean the minimum number of bits required to rep-
resent the information contained in it. A direct
measure of this is its compressibility [6]. Although
the sequence is pseudo random, meaning that they
may be compressed using the exact equation that
generated them, since the details of the parame-
ters of the equation (secret keys) are not available
to the hacker, we discard this possibility. In this
situation, a rough estimate of the complexity of a
data set may be obtained using the Huffman al-
gorithm [25] for data compression. The Huffman
algorithm computes the redundancy of data in a se-
quence and then replaces them using some symbols
that require lesser number of bits and thus reduces
the size of the data sequence. We do not go into
the details of the algorithm here, but would cite
[26] as a practical reference. The ratio of the size
of the original cipher text to that of the compressed
text is a measure of the complexity or randomness
of the cipher text. The higher the ratio, the lesser
is the complexity.
For the analysis, a large set of English prose was
chosen at random. Each plain text was about a few
kilobytes in size. The choice was made taking into
consideration the ease of comparison with earlier
studies. We used the ASCII code to represent the
English alphabets (8 bits per letter). The Linux
version of gzip software with maximum compres-
sion option (gzip -9) was used to compress the files.
This is the GNU lossless data compression package
popular on most UNIX type machines. In all the
test cases, the compression ratio was less than one
since the coding resulted in files larger in size than
the original files. This additional size was required
to keep the coding information and the original file
could not be compressed at all. This indicates that
the complexity measure of the cipher text sequence
is the same as the complexity of the embedding fi-
nite space and is the theoretical maximum.
4.3 Brute force attack
The straight forward attack on any cipher is the
brute force attack. Except for the computational
intensity, this is as simple as trying all the possible
combinations of the variables in the system. In the
cipher proposed by the cipher equation, the inde-
pendent variables are λ, xn and x
′
n. Assume that
the value of λ is significant up to k bits and that
of xn and x
′
n each up to m bits. We say that a bit
is significant if the system has a different evolution
when the bit flips its value. Thus for brute force
attack, the hacker requires a maximum of 22m+k at-
tempts to break the value of λ. If we assume that
k = m = 16 bits, the brute force attack requires a
maximum of 248 computations.
The general procedure of the attack is like this:
take some samples from the middle of the cipher-
text that appears to have the highest probability
of containing some meaningful data. Reverse en-
gineer using the cipher equation all the possible
values of xn, x
′
n and λ until some meaningful text
is generated. If the hacker has a known plain text
database, the complete process may be automated.
Then he only need to compare the two. If an ex-
act match is found, he has succeeded in breaking
the codes. He may now apply this information on
the entire ciphertext and retrieve the location and
method used to hide the starting value. This com-
pletely decodes the cipher.
One solution to this problem is to increase the
number of bits used for the parameters in the ci-
pher. But this is not foolproof, since the proba-
bility for getting the right guess in a reasonable
number of iterations is not zero. We suggest mul-
tiple encryption as a better approach. Since a sin-
gle flip of any of the bits of the parameters would
result in a different sequence that diverge away
from the original sequence exponentially at every
point, in this case, the hacker has to either assume
the ciphertext generated in the previous encryp-
tion or has to do 2n(2m+k) computations to obtain
the plaintext information. Here n is the number
of times the encryption has been done. Certainly,
there is an upper limit to the possible maximum
value for n. This is mainly due to the finiteness of
the embedding phase space and the block size. As
computational power increases, there would be a
proportional increase in the word size handled by
the machine also. Thus it may be argued that there
would always exist a safe margin between the at-
tainable complexity and the time required for brute
force attacks.
4.4 Plain text attack
We will now attempt a known plain text attack
on the system. Let us assume that Pn represent
a k-bit number with each bit represented by Pn[k].
Then, Pn[k] = 0 iff xn[k] = x
′
n[k]. The initial setting
is such that x0 and x
′
0 are different. However, due
to the mixing of xn+1 with Cn, there is a non-zero
probability for Pn = 0. The risk with Pn going
to zero is that this would cause the cipher to be
same as the plain text information. However, it
can be shown that Pn and Pn+1 will never be zero
simultaneously if yn, the plain text is not a null
vector. This is a simple condition since a null vec-
tor does not have any information content and is
never transmitted.
In this situation, with a known plain text, the
attacker is able to identify the locations in the ci-
pher text that match the state vectors in the plain
text and thus conclude that they correspond to lo-
cations where Pn = 0. Considering this possibility,
the question is to what extent the attacker may
extend this information to crack the secret codes,
namely λ and some other critical parameters used
to generate the Cipher text like the coding of the
starting vector x0.
Let at some level m, Pm = 0.
This means, xm = x
′
m.
⇒x∗m
⊕
xm−1
⊕
x
′
m−1
⊕
yn = x
′
m with x
∗
m rep-
resenting xn+1 in the cipher equation.
⇒x∗m
⊕
xm−1
⊕
x
′
m−1
⊕
x
′
m = yn
⇒(4λxm−1(1 − xm−1))
⊕
xm−1
⊕
x
′
m−1⊕
(4λx
′
m−1(1− x
′
m−1)) = yn
Due to the inability to solve the above equation
for λ and x0, we conclude that the cipher is resis-
tant to known plain text attacks.
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Figure 5: A comparative study of the proposed
system with three popular ciphers is shown here. A
flat region in the graph represents regions that does
not have representative vectors in the cipher text.
The ideal case is to span the entire phase space
uniformly ( a straight line with positive slope), as
that would correspond to maximum cycle length
for the generated random sequence.
5 Comparison with other Ciphers
For a comparison of the new method with some
of the popular ciphers, three popular ciphers were
chosen. They are:
1. Crypto (v.2.9) 95—NT: Copyright 1998 by
Gregory Braun. This software is a free-ware.
2. PGP 5.0 for Personal Privacy, Evaluation ver-
sion, Copyright 1997 by Pretty Good Privacy
and using RSA key of size 2048.
3. PGP 5.0 for Personal Privacy, Evaluation ver-
sion, Copyright 1997 by Pretty Good Pri-
vacy and using DSS/Diffie-Hellman key of size
1024/3072.
The entropy distribution as a function of the
state vector for all the above three ciphers along
with that from the new method is shown in figure
5. It is seen that the proposed method produces
the ideal distribution, a linear increase in entropy
count at all bit levels in the finite space.
Resistance of a cipher to differential and linear
cryptanalysis may be quantitatively measured to
some extent as its ability to hide any tangible in-
formation regarding the population of the states in
the plain text. This is to say that the probability
distribution density of the cipher text should be in-
dependent of the frequency distribution of the plain
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
’RSA’
’Diffie_Hellman’
’Crypto’
’PlainText’
’nspkbj’
Figure 6: For an ideal cipher, the probability dis-
tribution density of the cipher text should be inde-
pendent of the frequency distribution of the plain
text data. The diagram shows the distribution of
the plain text information along with the output
of the three ciphers mentioned in the text and also
the one proposed. The proposed cipher has almost
ideal distribution (equal level) at all bit levels.
text data. In an ideal case, the probability of oc-
currence at all possible levels of the iteration should
be the same. This would result in a straight line
parallel to the axis of possible states of the system.
Figure 6 shows such a graph of the probability dis-
tribution density of the cipher texts produced by
the popular ciphers mentioned above along with
that by the new method. It may be noted that the
new method produces a graph which is almost a
straight line as required by the ideal case.
6 Conclusion
A new algorithm for secure communication us-
ing mixing of two or more chaotic sequences is dis-
cussed. The mixing of two near by trajectories of
the logistic equation in the fully developed chaotic
scenario is shown to generate pseudo random num-
bers of high complexity. The system appears to
be resistant to brute force, known plain text and
differential cryptanalysis. Since the computation
is limited to finite space and mostly XOR oper-
ations, a successful attack based on Differential
Power Analysis and Timing Attacks are not real-
istic on the system. Thus even for small values of
the secret key size, the cipher appears to be se-
cure to the popular methods of cryptanalysis. The
paper also discuss some measures to identify sig-
nificant features like cycle length and probability
distribution density and compares the new cipher
with some popular ciphers.
References
[1] G. Brassard, Modern Cryptology - A Tutorial,
LNCS 325, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1988.
[2] W. Diffie, M. E. Hellman, “Privacy and Au-
thentication: An introduction to Cryptogra-
phy,” in Proc. IEEE, vol. 67, no.3, pp. 397 -
427, 1979.
[3] P. Berge, Y. Pomeav and C. Vidal, Order
within Chaos, Hermann, Paris, France, 1986.
[4] J. Gleick,Chaos: Making a New Science,
Viking Penguin, New York, 1987.
[5] G. Nicolis and I. Prigogine, Exploring Com-
plexity, W. H. Freeman and Company, New
York, 1989.
[6] T. Ritter, “The Efficient Generation of Cryp-
tographic Confusion Sequences,” Cryptologia,
vol. 15, no.2, pp. 81 - 139, 1991.
[7] M. Louis Pecora and L. Thomas Carroll, “Syn-
chronization in Chaotic systems,” Physical Re-
view Letters, vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 821 - 824, 1990.
[8] H. Li and J. Chern, “Coding the chaos in a
semiconductor diode for information transmis-
sion,” Physics Letters A, vol. 206, pp. 217 -
221, 1995.
[9] Y. H. Yu, K. Kwak and T. K. Lim, “Secure
communication using small time continuous
feedback,” Physics Letters A, vol. 197, pp. 311
- 315, 1995.
[10] T. Ritter, “Substitution Cipher with Pseudo-
Random Shuffling: The Dynamic Substitution
Combiner,” Cryptologia, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 289
- 303, 1990.
[11] M. MacLaren and G. Marsaglia, “Uniform
Random Number Generator,” Journal of As-
sociation for Computing Machinery, vol. 12
no. 1, pp. 83 - 89, 1965.
[12] S. Wolfram, “Cryptography with Cellular Au-
tomata (extended abstract),” in: Advances
in Cryptography, CRYPTO’85 Proceedings,
Springer-Verlag, pp. 429 - 432, 1986.
[13] V. Pless , “Encryption Schemes for Computer
Confidentiality,” IEEE Transactions on Com-
puters, vol. C-26, no. 11, pp. 1133 - 1136, 1977.
[14] C. Beck, Signal Processing VI: Theories and
applications, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1992.
[15] J. Cernak, “Digital generators of chaos,”
Physics letters A, vol. 214, pp. 151 - 160, 1996.
[16] R. Matthews, “On the Derivation of a Chaotic
Encryption Algorithm,” Cryptologia, vol. 13,
pp. 29 - 42, 1989.
[17] D. Wheeler, “Problems with Chaotic Cryp-
tosystems,” Cryptologia, vol. 13, pp. 243 - 250,
1989.
[18] D. Mitchell, “Nonlinear Key Generators,”
Cryptologia, vol. 14, pp. 350-354, 1990.
[19] E. Rietman, Exploring the Geometry of Na-
ture, Windcrest Books, Blue Ridge Summit,
P.A, 1989.
[20] T. Siegenthaler, “Decrypting a Class of
Stream Ciphers Using Ciphertext Only,”
IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. C-34,
pp. 81 - 85, (1985).
[21] D. Knuth, The art of Computer Program-
ming, Vol.2, Seminumerical Algorithms, 2nd
ed., Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts,
1981.
[22] T. Ritter, “The story of Combination Corre-
lation: A Literature Survey,” Research com-
ments from Ciphers by Ritter, (1996), URL:
http://www.io.com/∼ ritter/ under Litera-
ture Surveys and Reviews.
[23] E. Fischer, “A theoretical Measure of Cryp-
tographic Performance,” Cryptologia, vol. 5,
no.1, 1981.
[24] E. Biham and A. Shamir, “Differential Crypt-
analysis of DES-like Cryptosystems,” in: Ad-
vances in Cryptology: Crypto’90, Springer-
Verlag, 1990.
[25] D. Huffman, “A method for the construction
of Minimum-Redundency Codes,” in: Proceed-
ings of the IRE, vol. 40, pp. 1098 - 1101, 1952.
[26] S. Heller, Efficient C/C++ Programming:
Smaller, Faster, Better, 2nd Edition, chapters
1-4, Academic Press Professional, 1991.
